FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN ALASKA:
INTERPRETING THE ALASKA

CONSTITUTION
STEVEN KEITH GREEN*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Travelers who spend any time in Dillingham, a fishing village on
Alaska's southwest coast, notice the large number of churches in the
small community. Several churches dot the "downtown" area and the
roads leading out of town. In addition to Russian Orthodox, Catholic,
and Baptist churches, Dillingham boasts congregations of Moravians,
Seventh-Day Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses, Mormons, Bahias, as
well as several pentecostal groups.1 The town, however, lacks
branches of the more mainline denominations, such as Methodists,
Presbyterians, Lutherans, Congregationalists, or Episcopalians. As a
result, the Baptist congregation serves as the town's only mainline
Protestant church and, by default, as its most liberal.
While the situation in Dillingham is hardly representative of
church affiliation in Alaska, it is indicative of the religious diversity
that exists throughout the state. If diversity in belief and practice is a
fair indicator of the extent of religious liberty that exists under a particular government, Alaskans have much to be thankful for. James
Madison, the author of the first amendment to the United States Constitution, 2 would be proud, for, as he maintained, diversity of religious
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1. While Native religion continues to exist in Alaska, it is most commonly found
in conjunction with Moravian and Russian Orthodox beliefs. For a general discussion
on the resiliency of Native American beliefs within white churches, see H. BOWDEN,
AMERICAN INDIANS AND CHRISTIAN MISSIONS,

207-20 (1981), and C.

STARKLOFF,

THE PEOPLE OF THE CENTER: AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGION AND CHRISTIANITY

(1974).
2. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof...." U.S. CONST. amend. I.

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:237

the liberty to believe, but also serves as the basis
belief not only ensures
3

for all civil rights.

Are religious beliefs and practices protected sufficiently in
Alaska? Is the freedom to believe or not believe "protected absolutely" as the Alaska Supreme Court has asserted?4 Are Alaskans
provided any greater protection under the state constitution than
under the federal Constitution, or must they rely on the Bill of Rights
for the preservation of what Madison considered to be our most important right?5 To what extent are church and state truly separate in

Alaska, and how would Alaska courts handle troubling issues such as
prayer in public schools or financial aid to parochial institutions?
This article will review the Alaska decisions concerning the free
exercise and establishment of religion. The status of religious liberty
in Alaska will be explored and compared to the current federal protections. The Alaska standards for free exercise and establishment claims
will be examined separately, 6 to be followed by a review of those cases
and statutes covering religious tax exemption.
Generally speaking, the Alaska Constitution provides a high degree of protection for the practice of religious beliefs. 7 The Alaska
Supreme Court has required exceptions to neutral legislation that only
incidentally infringed upon religious practice.8 Compared to the recent interpretations of the federal religious clauses by the United

States Supreme Court, 9 the Alaska Constitution provides greater protection for religious exercise.

3. "In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for
religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the
other in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in both cases will depend on
the number of interests and sects.... ." THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 324 (J. Madison)
(C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
4. Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Alaska 1979).
5. ALASKA CONST., art. I, § 4. See Messerli v. State, 626 P.2d 81, 83 (Alaska
1980) (noting several instances where the Alaska Constitution provides broader protection of rights of Alaskans than does the United States Constitution).
6. Any separation of issues for the sake of analysis is always artificial. Church
and state cases often involve a combination of free exercise and establishment claims.
See Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985); Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592
P.2d 1233 (Alaska 1979), discussed infra note 76. For an analysis of the conflict inherent between the two religious clauses, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 1166-69 (2d ed. 1988).
7. Frank, 604 P.2d at 1070.
8. Wondzell v. Alaska Wood Prod., 601 P.2d 584 (Alaska 1979).
9. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protection Ass'n, - U.S. -, 108 S. Ct.
1319 (1988) (first amendment did not prevent logging of American Indian religious
burial ground); O'Lone v. Shabazz, - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 2400 (1987) (first amendment did not prevent prison officials from denying Islamic prisoners special worship
privileges).
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The Alaska Supreme Court interprets the state's establishment
clause more strictly than its federal counterpart interprets the first
amendment.1 0 The court disallows incidental benefits to religion that
the United States Supreme Court held constitutional," and it narrowly construes religious tax exemptions, emphasizing that the burden
of maintaining government "should be fairly apportioned on the property of all .... 1 2 Considered together, the Alaska court's decisions on
free exercise, establishment, and tax exemption indicate a concern for
maintaining a clear separation between church and state. This article
will serve both as a review of Alaska's constitutional standards and as
a guide for attorneys faced with claims raising religious issues.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The Alaska provision governing religious freedom is found in article I, section 4, of the state constitution:
Freedom of Religion. No law shall be made respecting an1 establish3
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
The language of section 4 is taken almost verbatim from the religion
clauses of the first amendment to the United States Constitution.1 4 On
its face, the provision suggests nothing more nor less than the federal
constitutional requirements. Like its federal counterpart, section 4
prohibits any law "respecting" the establishment of religion, not simply laws that would establish a state religion.15 In addition, the clause
provides that the government may not pass laws that "prohibit" the
exercise of religion, thereby leaving room for less obtrusive abridgements. 16 Indeed, freedom of speech in Alaska appears to be more absolutely protected, as every person is entitled to "freely speak, write,
10. Sheldon Jackson College v. State, 599 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1979).
11. Compare Sheldon Jackson College v. State, 599 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1979) and
Matthews v. Quinton, 362 P.2d 932 (Alaska 1961) with Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388
(1983) (tuition tax exemptions to parents of students attending private and parochial
schools is constitutional) and Americans United for Separation of Church and State v.

Blanton, 433 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Tenn. 1976), aff'd mem. 434 U.S. 803 (1977) (state

tuition remission to students attending religious colleges does not violate the establishment clause).
12. Greater Anchorage Area Borough v. Sisters of Charity, 553 P.2d 467, 469
(Alaska 1976).
13. ALAsKA CONST., art. I, § 4.
14. See supra note 2.
15. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947). However, there are
those, including Chief Justice Rehnquist, who maintain the first amendment was intended to do no more than forbid the establishment of a national church or prohibit
preferences among religions. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 106 (1985) (Rehn-

quist, J., dissenting).
16. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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and publish on all subjects .... -1"7 This distinction, however, is similar
to that found in the first amendment, which prohibits abridgements of
speech and the press, a protection much broader than that afforded
religious exercises. 18 A government can do much to infringe upon a
right short of an outright prohibition. 19
In addition to article I, section 4, the Alaska Constitution contains two provisions that come into play in situations involving establishment claims. Article VII, section 1, deals with public education
and makes several references to religion:
The legislature shall by a general law establish and maintain a system of public schools open to all children of the State, and may
provide for other public educational institutions. Schools and institutions so established shall be free from sectarian control. No
money shall be paid from public funds for the direct
20 benefit of any
religious or other private educational institution.
Similarly, article IX, section 6, provides:
No tax shall be levied, or appropriation of public money made, or
public property transferred, nor shall the public credit be used, except for a public purpose. 2 1
The above provisions are not unique to the Alaska Constitution. By
the early twentieth century, most states had adopted similar constitutional provisions to prevent public appropriations for religious purposes. 22 But similar prohibitions against the expenditure of public
monies for private or parochial education have not prevented legislatures in other states from appropriating funds to aid religious enterprises. 23 The terms "public purpose" 2 4 and "direct benefit" 25 are
17. ALASKA CONST., art. I, § 5. See Messerli v. State, 626 P.2d 81, 83 (Alaska
1980).
18. For over 100 years, the United States Supreme Court has consistently held
that government can restrict religious practice without actually prohibiting the free
exercise of beliefs. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879) (upholding a law
prohibiting polygamy). See also Pack v. Tennessee ex rel. Swann, 424 U.S. 954 (1976)
(upholding a state court decision enjoining a pentecostal group from handling poisonous snakes and consuming strychnine, even though the church members participated
voluntarily and they maintained that their faith required such practices).
19. See also ALASKA CONST., art. I, § 3 (providing that "[n]o person is to be
denied the enjoyment of any civil or political right because of race, color, sex, or
national origin.. .," suggesting a greater level of protection as well as a broader cause
of action).
20. ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1.
21. ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 6.
22. W. BLAKELY, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS 523-55 (1911).
23. See, ag., Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (upholding New York
law requiring local public school officials to lend textbooks free of charge to all stu-

dents including those attending parochial and private schools); Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (upholding New Jersey law providing free public transportation for public and parochial schools).
24. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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necessarily vague, thereby providing
ample opportunity for legislative
26
and judicial interpretation.
Finally, article IX, section 4, deals with exceptions to assessments
for property taxation.2 7 It states in pertinent part:
All, or any portion of, property used exclusively for non-profit reli-

gious, charitable, cemetery, or educational purposes, as defined by
law, shall be exempt from taxation. Other exemptions
of like or
28
different kind may be granted by general law.
The definition of "property used for religious purposes" is found in
Alaska's Municipal Taxation Statute and includes church buildings

and schools, ministerial residences, administrative offices, and parking
lots relatively close thereto. 29 The Alaska Supreme Court had the opportunity on several occasions to interpret the meaning of article IX,
section 4, and the Municipal Taxation Statute. These cases are discussed in part V, below.

III.

FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION

United States Supreme Court Justice William 0. Douglas wrote

that the free exercise clause embraces two aspects. First, it protects
"the right to maintain theories of life and of death and of the hereafter
which are rank heresy to followers of the orthodox faiths."' 30 Second,
the free exercise clause "forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship. ' ' 31 The
25. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
26. Sheldon Jackson College v. State, 599 P.2d 127, 129 (Alaska 1979).
27. The Alaska Constitution contains one further reference of a religious nature.
In an apparent contradiction to the above provisions (and to itself), the preamble
contains the following reference:
We the people of Alaska, grateful to God and to those who founded our
nation and pioneered this great land, in order to secure and transmit to succeeding generations our heritage of political, civil, and religious liberty
within the Union of States, do ordain and establish this constitution for the
State of Alaska.
ALASKA

CONST. preamble (emphasis added).

28. ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 4.
29. ALASKA STAT. § 29.45.030(b). In subsection (a) of this section, "property
used exclusively for religious purposes" includes the following property owned by a
religious organization:
(1) the residence of a bishop, pastor, priest, rabbi, minister, or religious
order of a recognized religious organization;
(2) a structure, its furniture, and its fixtures used solely for public worship,
charitable purposes, religious administrative offices, religious education, or a
non-profit hospital;
(3) lots required by local ordinance for parking near a structure defined in
(2) of this subsection.
ALASKA STAT. § 29.45.030(b) (1986).
30. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944).
31. Id. (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940)).
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Alaska Supreme Court followed the lead of the federal Court in setting
standards for determining government infringements of the right to
freely exercise one's religious beliefs. 32 This is due in part to the
supremacy clause of the federal Constitution. 33 The United States
Constitution, and the Supreme Court's interpretation of it vis-a-vis judicial review, represents the supreme law of the land and serves as the
minimum standard for state actions affecting fundamental rights. But
this deference is also due to the fact that Alaska did not become a state
until 1959, well after the Supreme Court had decided several important church and state cases. 34 Therefore, unlike most states, old interpretations of the religion clauses did not have to be adjusted in Alaska
35
to meet the stricter federal standards.
The current standard for free exercise claims raised under article
I, section 4, of the Alaska Constitution is found in the case of Frankv.
State.36 In Frank the defendant was convicted of violating fish and
game regulations by taking a moose out of season. At trial, Frank
claimed he was entitled to an exemption from the regulations because
of his religious beliefs. The trial court found that the moose had been
killed for an Athabascan funeral potlach. The court noted testimony
that the potlach was an "integral part of the cultural religious belief of
the central Alaska Athabascan Indian. ' ' 37 Still, the trial court rejected
the defendant's claim that his action had been religiously protected
and convicted Frank.
On appeal, the supreme court reversed the conviction, holding
that Frank was entitled to an exemption from the fish and game regulations on account of his religious beliefs. 38 First, the court asserted
32. Id.
33. U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 2 (providing in pertinent part: "This Constitution,
and the laws of the United States which shall be made in the pursuance thereof...
shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound
thereby ....").
34. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding release time for attending
religious classes); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (nationalizing the
establishment clause); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)
(recognizing religious exemptions from participating in patriotic exercises); Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (nationalizing the free exercise clause and establishing the substantial state interest standard).
35. In fact, because of its territorial status until 1959, the protections of the federal Constitution applied to all governmental actions in Alaska. See Rassmussen v.

United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905) (holding that Alaska was incorporated into the
United States and that its citizens were entitled to the protections of the Bill of
Rights). Therefore, the cases nationalizing the religious clauses to the states
(Cantwell, 310 U.S. 296, and Everson, 330 U.S. 1) did not apply in Alaska until
statehoood. Before 1959, the first amendment applied directly to Alaska.
36. 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979).
37. Id. at 1069.
38. Ia at 1075 (4-1 decision) (Connor, J., dissenting).
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that freedom of religious belief is "protected absolutely" in Alaska. 39
"No value has a higher place in our constitutional system of government than that of religious freedom." 4 The court held that the freedom to practice those beliefs is also protected, although religious
actions may be subjected to limited governmental regulation. The
government can regulate religiously motivated actions only where its
interests are "of the highest order. '4 1 By so holding, the court
adopted the federal "compelling governmental interest" standard:
that laws which indirectly infringe upon religious beliefs and practices
can be upheld only where they present the least restrictive means of
accomplishing a compelling governmental objective. 42
The court set out a three-step process for determining whether
religious claims are entitled to the higher level of constitutional protection. To invoke the protections of the free exercise clause, and thereby
force the government to show a compelling interest for its regulation
or action, (1) religion must be involved, (2) the conduct in question
'4 3
must be religiously based, and (3) the claimant must be "sincere.
The three steps, while appearing straightforward, deserve brief
analysis.
In Frank, the court accepted the lower court's finding that the
defendant had presented a religious claim; therefore, the court found it
unnecessary to expand on how lower courts should arrive at the first
step of the test.44 While the religious basis for a claim may appear
obvious in many situations, in others the "religious" nature may be
less clear. Historically, courts have been hesitant to define religion,
39. Id. at 1070.
40. Id.
41. Id.
Because of the close relationship between conduct and belief and because of
the high value we assign to religious beliefs, religiously impelled actions can
be forbidden only where they pose "some substantial threat to public safety,
peace or order," ... or where there are competing governmental interests
that are "of the highest order and ...[are] not otherwise served."
Id. at 1070 (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963); Wisconsin v. Yoder,

406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972)).
Interestingly, Justice Matthews also quoted approvingly from Justice Brennan's
concurring opinion in McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978), where Brennan questioned the ability of courts to draw distinctions between beliefs and actions. The
adoption of such a position, that action is so intertwined with religious belief that any
attempt to regulate the former will limit the latter, would significantly broaden those
actions considered to be religiously protected.
42. Id. at 1070. See Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
43. 604 P.2d at 1071.
44. Id. at 1071-72.

244
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usually opting for a functional, as opposed to a substantive, definition. 4 5 While the Alaska Supreme Court has never specifically
adopted a functional definition of religion in a constitutional context,
it came close to doing so through the interpretation of an Alaska statute prohibiting labor discrimination on the basis of religious beliefs. 46
In Wondzell v. Alaska Wood Products,Inc. ("Wondzell I"), the court
recognized this statute as "accord[ing] the same privileges to all sincere conscientious beliefs, whether or not they are accompanied by a
belief in a supreme being."'4 7 Therefore, a "sincere and meaningful
belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that
filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption"
comes within the statutory definition of religion. 4 8 Whether this
broad, functional definition of religion can be translated to free exercise claims is unclear, but the court implied there existed a constitutional basis for its interpretation of the statute.49
Once a religious claim has been established, the claimant must
show that the conduct in question is religiously based. In Frank,however, the court rejected the lower court's ruling that the conduct must
be "essential" to the religious belief to be protected. According to the
court, so long as the practice is "deeply rooted in the religious belief"
it will receive the protection of the free exercise clause.5 0 A showing
that the conduct is absolutely necessary to the religious belief is not
required.
Finally, a claim will come within the ambit of the free exercise
clause upon a showing that the claimant is sincere in his beliefs. Technically, the claimant carries this burden. 51 In practice, sincerity can
be inferred from a showing under the first two steps, as occurred in
Frank, and the government will then have the burden to disprove
45. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 449 (1971); Welsh v. United States,
398 U.S. 333, 339 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165, 176 (1965);
Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1031 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 908
(1982); Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 207 (3d Cir. 1979); Choper, Defining "Religion" in the FirstAmendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. Rnv. 579; Note, The Sacred and the
Profane: A FirstAmendment Definition ofReligion, 61 TEx L. REv. 139 (1982); Note,
Toward a ConstitutionalDefinition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1056 (1978).

46.

ALASKA STAT.

§ 18.80.220 (1986).

47. 583 P.2d 860, 866 n.12 (Alaska 1978), vacated, 601 P.2d 584 (Alaska 1979).
Even though the court later vacated this decision, the above statement apparently
continues to represent the opinion of the majority of the court.
48. Id. (quoting United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965)).
49. In order to avoid danger of unconstitutionality we would interpret AS
18.80.220 to accord the same privileges to all sincere conscientious beliefs,
whether or not they are accompanied by a belief in a supreme being.
Id. at 866 n.12.
50. 604 P.2d at 1072-73.
51. U.S. v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965); Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d
1025, 1030 (3d Cir. 1982). See also L. TRIBE, supra note 6, at 1242-46.
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sincerity.5 2 This step is derived from the case of United States v. Ballard, where the United States Supreme Court held that secular courts
lacked the power to judge the truth of religious allegations.5 3 At this
stage the only issue open for courts is whether the asserted religious
belief is sincerely held.
Once the claimant has satisfied the three-part test, the burden
shifts to the government to prove that it has a compelling interest in
the regulation to justify the infringement upon the religiously based
conduct. But even a compelling interest will not save the law's application if the state could have provided an exemption for the protected
conduct. The issue "is whether that interest, or any other, will suffer if
an exemption is granted to accommodate the religious practice. .... -54
Thus, in Frank the court found that even though the state had a compelling interest in the uniform application of the game regulations, it
only minimal hardship in granting an exemption to the
would suffer
55
defendant.
Frank is significant because the court upheld the religious claim
in spite of an important governmental interest that only indirectly burdened the religious practice. Even though Frank presented a unique
set of circumstances, there is no indication that the court has retreated
from its position. Recently, in Herning v. Eason,56 the court affirmed
the standard in Frank as well as its ultimate holding.
Free exercise claims have also arisen in the area of employment
discrimination. In Wondzell 157 the court interpreted a state statute
prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of race, alienage,
sex, or religion as requiring reasonable accommodation of religious beliefs. 58 Wondzell involved a Jehovah's Witness who was threatened
with dismissal from employment when he refused to join a union. In
an opinion drafted by Justice Connor, the court held that the employer
had reasonably accommodated the employee's religious beliefs by providing an exemption from union membership while still requiring the
52. L. TRIBE, supra note 6, at 1245-51.
53. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
54. Frank 604 P.2d at 1073.
55. Id. at 1073-74. The court also rejected the argument that the state's granting
of an exemption would amount to an establishment of religion. The accommodation
of religious beliefs and practices does not equate with an establishment of religion.
The exemption, stated the court, "reflects nothing more than the governmental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences, and does not represent that involvement of religious with secular institutions which it is the object of the
Establishment Clause to forestall .. " Id. at 1075 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 234 n.22 (1972)).
56. 739 P.2d 167, 169 (Alaska 1987).
57. 583 P.2d 860 (Alaska 1978).
58. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220 (1986).
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payment of dues. 59 On reconsideration, the court, in a new opinion by
Justice Matthews ("Wondzell I"), reversed its earlier decision and
held that the statute required an exemption from dues as well as membership. 60 The claimant was allowed to pay an amount equal to dues

to a charity, which was consistent with his religious beliefs. The court
also held that the burden of proving undue hardship resulting from an
61
exemption would lie with the employer and the union.

Statutes and ordinances that indirectly infringe upon the right of
free exercise may also be attacked on grounds of vagueness and over-

breadth. 62 Laws, such as anti-solicitation or disorderly conduct ordinances, can be challenged as void for vagueness or overbroad in their

application if they significantly impair protected first amendment expressions while not substantially furthering a strong governmental
63
interest.

While the Alaska Supreme Court has not considered a vagueness
or overbreadth challenge through a free exercise claim, it has addressed such issues in other free expression contexts. In Marks v. City
of Anchorage, the court declared that a vaguely worded disorderly
conduct ordinance infringed upon rights of free speech and assembly,
rendering it unconstitutional." Two years later the court reaffirmed
the Marks doctrine in Stock v. State.65 The court held that a statute,

although neutral on its face, may be unconstitutionally vague if it can
be construed in such a manner so as to restrict the exercise of first
59. 583 P.2d at 867.
60. 601 P.2d 584, 585 (Alaska 1979).
61. Id. at 586. The most recent employment discrimination case raising a religious claim, Borkowski v. Snowden, 665 P.2d 22 (Alaska 1983), was reversed on procedural grounds without the religious issues being addressed.
62. See Village of Schamburg v. Citizens for Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620
(1980); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (Murphy, J.,concurring).
63. Id.
64. 500 P.2d 644 (Alaska 1972).
[A] statute violates the [overbreadth] doctrine when constitutionally-protected conduct as well as conduct which the state can legitimatly regulate
are included within the ambit of the statute's prohibition. By contrast, specific constitutional guarantees are not necessarily implicated when a statute
is declared void for vagueness. The latter doctrine comes into play when the
statutory language is so indefinite that the perimeters of the prohibited zone
of conduct are unclear; a statute may be unconstitutionally vague even
though no activities specifically protected by the Constitution are outlawed.
A vague statute violates the due process clause both because it fails to give
adequate notice to the ordinary citizen of what is prohibited and because its
indefinite contours confer unbridled discretion on government officials and
thereby raise the possibility of uneven and discriminatory enforcement.
Id. at 646 (footnotes omitted).
65. 526 P.2d 3 (Alaska 1974).
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amendment rights. 66 These cases, read in conjunction with Frank, indicate that Alaska courts will closely scrutinize laws that indirectly
infringe upon the rights to free religious expression and overturn them
if they are vague or overbroad.
Just as laws cannot criminalize religious expression without a
showing of a compelling state interest, 67 the free exercise clause also
prevents the government from placing individuals at a disadvantage
because of their religious beliefs. In Flores v. State,68 the court ruled
that belief in a supreme being was not a prerequisite for a witness'
competency to testify at a trial. The court held that even though the
witness had admitted that he did not believe in God after he had
sworn to tell the truth, stating "so help me God," the opposing party
could not attack his credibility. 69 Similarly, in Johnson v. Johnson,70 a
child custody case, the court rejected a father's contention that the
trial court abused its discretion in awarding custody to the children's
mother because of her membership in the Jehovah's Witnesses. 71 Despite the father's claim that the mother's religious beliefs would restrict the children's educational and cultural development, the court
held that the consideration of her religious beliefs would violate her
free exercise rights. 72 Religious belief alone cannot be the cause of a
detriment before the law.
73
Still, the right to religious practice in Alaska is not absolute.
All religious practices are subject to neutral laws that impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner in which the rights are
exercised. In Seward Chapel, Inc. v. City of Seward,74 a church sought
declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of a city zoning ordinance that forbade the operation of a school on the church
property. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of the petition
66. Id. at 7. In addition, the courts must consider whether the statute provides
adequate notice to the ordinary citizen and whether it gives undue discretion to authorities in determining what constitutes a violation. "A statute may not create a
threat of criminal penalties which [might] inhibit the exercise of those [basic] rights so
essential to our form of government[,] such as freedom of speech, press, religion and to
assemble peaceably." Id. at 7.
67. Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979); Stock v. State, 526 P.2d 3
(Alaska 1974); Marks v. City of Anchorage, 500 P.2d 644 (Alaska 1972).
68. 443 P.2d 73, 77-78 (Alaska 1968); accord, Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488
(1961) (holding that a belief in God cannot be a prerequisite for holding public office).
69. 443 P.2d at 77-78.
70. 564 P.2d 71 (Alaska 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1048 (1978).
71. Id. at 76.
72. Id. "Certainly, we cannot use [the mother's] continued membership in the
Jehovah's Witnesses as a basis for directing the trial court to award the children to
[the father]. To do so would be violative of her right to [freedom of religion] under the
First Amendment. . . ." Id.
73. Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Alaska 1979).
74. 655 P.2d 1293 (Alaska 1982).
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and held that the church was not entitled to an exemption from the
75
facially neutral law.
Crucial to the court's holding was the fact that the operation of
the school at the contested location was not a religious tenet or belief
of the church members. The church merely sought the variance for
the sake of convenience and economy. 76 Furthermore, the zoning ordinance did not prohibit the operation of parochial schools throughout
the city, but only in the subdivision where the church was located.
This distinction, between an outright ban and a regulation which took
into account the impact of a school on the neighborhood, was one of
"constitutional significance" for the court. 77 The accommodation requirement set forth in Frank did not control; the zoning ordinance
placed a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction on the exercise
of religious action.
Two additional cases that raised free exercise issues deserve brief
analysis. First, in Bonjour v. Bonjour,78 a child custody case also involving establishment clause issues, the court implied that parents may
lack standing to raise free exercise claims for their children. 79 In Bonjour, the mother had contended that the award of custody to the father
had violated both her and her son's rights to freely exercise their religious beliefs. Because the court reversed under the establishment
clause, it found it unnecessary to address the free exercise claims. In
passing on the issue, however, the court specifically questioned the
mother's standing to raise the issue for her son.8 0 Such a holding, if
followed in future cases, would be highly significant, especially in light
of recent cases where parents have claimed that school districts have
violated their children's
free exercise rights through the teaching of
"secular humanism. 8 1 Unless children are of sufficient age to state
75. Id. at 1301-02.
76. Id. The church also had notice of the zoning restriction prior to the purchase
of the church property. The court did, however, hear testimony that education of
children in a "Christian school" was "an integral aspect of the church members' religious beliefs." Id. at 1299.
77. Id. at 1301. Interestingly, the court, in a footnote, stated its willingness to
extend the accommodation requirement to the above situation. The court felt bound,
however, to follow the clear holding of the United States Supreme Court that such
zoning restrictions are constitutionally permissible. Id. at 1300 n.25.
78. 592 P.2d 1233 (Alaska 1979).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1241 n.15. The court did acknowledge, however, a parent's right to
challenge on appeal any determination by a court of what is in the best interest of the
child with regard to the child's free exercise rights.
81. See, e.g., Mozert v. Hawkins County Public Schools, 647 F. Supp. 1194 (E.D.
Tenn. 1986), rev'd, 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 108 S. Ct.
1029 (1988).
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their own preferences, courts will be required to dismiss such causes of
action.
The most recent case involving a free exercise issue is Herning v.
Eason.8 2 On its face, Herning appears troubling. The case involved a
dispute within the First Baptist Church of Fairbanks over the tenure
of its minister. The issue focused on whether the church could be
forced to accept proxy voting at church business meetings in the absence of a contrary provision in its bylaws. The court held that the
Alaska Nonprofit Corporation Act,83 which recognizes proxy voting,
applied to the church business meetings, in spite of a church claim that
such a ruling would involve the84courts in an inner-church dispute and
violate the free exercise clause.
Upon closer examination, it is clear that the court so ruled because the church had failed to present sufficient supporting evidence
that proxy voting was contrary to the tenets and practices of the Baptist church. In the absence of such evidence or a contrary provision in
the bylaws, the court held the Nonprofit Act applied. Although the
court made no reference in its decision, it apparently followed the
"neutral principles approach" of resolving church disputes as set out
by the United States Supreme Court in Jones v. Wolf 8 5 While civil
courts are prohibited from reviewing matters of religious practice and
doctrine, they are permitted to apply neutral principles of law86 where
necessary and appropriate to settle church property disputes.

IV.

THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

As with the free exercise clause, issues raising establishment
clause claims come up in several contexts. A primary area for establishment clause disputes involves governmental appropriation to sectarian institutions (aid to parochial schools or colleges). A second
area of litigation involves laws or practices that favor or confer a benefit to one religion to the detriment of other religions (or to non-believers).8 7 The Alaska Supreme Court considered cases in both areas.
As referred to above, the Alaska Constitution contains two provisions that appear on their face to prohibit the appropriation of public
82.
83.
84.
85.

739 P.2d 167 (Alaska 1987).
ALAsKA STAT. § 10.20.005-.725 (1986).
739 P.2d at 168-69.
443 U.S. 595 (1979).

86. Id. at 602-03. See also Presbyterian Church v. Hull Memorial Presbyterian

Church, 393 U.S. 440, 450-51 (1969).
87. See ALASKA STAT. § 14.03.090 (1966) (prohibiting the introduction of sectarian or denominational doctrine into the public schools); cf Frank v. State, 604 P.2d
1068, 1074-75 (Alaska 1979) (accommodation of an individual's religious beliefs, how-

ever, while appearing to indicate favoritism, is constitutional).
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monies for religious purposes. 8 Early on, the court struggled with
what constitutes a "public purpose" or a "direct benefit" to a religion.
The first two cases to consider the issue produced somewhat contradictory results. Matthews v. Quinton8 9 involved a challenge to a territorial statute, not repealed by the legislature, that provided for the free
transportation of children to non-public schools. 90 The court held
that the statute violated both the direct benefit provision of article VII,
section 1, and the public purpose provision of article IX, section 6.91
The court's decision, written by Justice Arend, specifically rejected the "child benefit" theory used by the United States Supreme
Court in Everson v. Board of Education92 to uphold public transportation for parochial students. 93 Following the lead of Justice Rutledge's
dissent in Everson, Justice Arend stated that free transportation did in
fact "aid, encourage, sustain and support," the religious purpose of
parochial education. "Payment of transportation is no more, nor is it
any the less essential to education, whether religious or secular, than
payment for tuitions, for teachers' salaries, for buildings, equipment
and necessary materials."' 94 The transportation directly benefited the
parochial school while it failed to meet a required public purpose for
appropriations.
Two years after Matthews, the court took a step back from its
strict interpretation of the two constitutional provisions. Lien v.
Ketchikan 95 involved a challenge to a lease of a hospital building, built
with a combination of federal, state, and local funds, to a non-profit
religious corporation. 96 In a decision by Justice Dimond (who had
dissented in Matthews) the court held the lease constitutional. The
court approached the lease, which was for a ten-year period at a rate
of $1.00 per year, as simply an agreement with a charitable corporation designed to serve a public purpose. The court stated that it was of
"no consequence" that the corporation was controlled by a religious
order. "[T]he test of whether a public purpose is being served does not
ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1, art. IX, § 6.
89. 362 P.2d 932 (Alaska 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 517 (1962).
90. Id. The petitioner, a student attending Fairbanks' Immaculate Conception
Elementary, sought to enforce the application of the statute after school district officials refused to continue with the practice of free transportation. Id. at 933-34.
91. Id. at 943.
92. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
93. 362 P.2d at 940-41. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 17-18. See also Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930) ("child benefit" theory originated
when Court decided to look only to the benefits conferred on the school children, not
to the advantage provided the parochial school).
94. 362 P.2d at 941 (quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 48 (Rutledge, J., dissenting)).
95. 383 P.2d 721 (Alaska 1963).
96. The lease was to the Catholic Sisters of St. Joseph of Newark. Only article
IX, section 6, the public purpose clause, was in issue.

88.

1988]

FREEDOM OFRELIGION

depend on the religious or non-religious nature of the agency that will
operate the leased property, but upon the character of the use to which
the property will be put."' 97 Therefore, the court saw nothing in the
agreement to indicate that public funds were being used for anything
other than a public purpose.
As Lien had only concerned the public purpose clause of article
IX, section 6, and not the direct benefit clause of article VII, section 1,
as in Matthews, it was unclear whether Lien overturned the earlier
holding. Lien clearly suggested a more accommodating approach to
government support of religious enterprises. 98 But any hope that Lien
represented a move toward a more accommodating view of separation
of church and state lost ground with the 1979 case of Sheldon Jackson
College v. State.99 The Sheldon Jackson College case, written by Justice Matthews, the author of Frank and Wondzell II, attempted to
clear up any confusion left by Matthews and Lien. The result was a
stricter interpretation of the public purpose and direct benefit provisions than announced in Lien, but not a return to the strict separationist language of Matthews.100
Sheldon Jackson College concerned the validity of a tuition grant
program for state residents attending private colleges in Alaska. Initially, the court asserted that the constitution did not prohibit indirect
or incidental benefits to religious schools. 10 1 Because the line between
direct and indirect benefits often is hazy, the court designed a fourpart test by which to measure programs that benefit religious institutions. First, the judiciary must examine the breadth of the class to
which the statutory benefits are to be directed. Second, the courts
must scrutinize the nature of the use to which the funds are put.
Third, the courts must consider the magnitude of the benefit conferred
on the religious institution. Finally, the courts must look to see
whether the program merely channels the funds through an intermediary to an otherwise prohibited recipient.102
97. 383 P.2d at 722. The court also found nothing in the corporation's articles of
incorporation to indicate that its objective was to "further [the] religious beliefs or
dogmas of the Catholic Church." However, if such objectives were to manifest, the
courts could intervene. Id. at 724.
98. The holding in Lien has been favorably cited as recently as December 31,
1985, in Comtec, Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage, 710 P.2d 1004, 1005 (Alaska
1985). See also 1966 Alaska Op. Att'y Gen. No. 3 (Apr. 22, 1966).
99. 599 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1979).
100. Id. at 130 n.20. The court specifically refused to rely on Matthews in reaching
its decision. While it questioned the continued authority of the case, the court declined to overrule it.
101. Id. at 129-30. For example, the state may provide for the health, safety, and
welfare of individual students attending private schools.
102. Id. at 130.
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The court found the program in Sheldon Jackson College failed
all four parts of the test. First, the court found the program benefited
a narrow class, since only students attending private colleges qualified
for the grants. 10 3 Furthermore, the nature of the funds expended and
the magnitude of the benefits bestowed indicated to the court nothing
less than a subsidy to the college, without which the college faced severe financial hardship. 1°4 Finally, even though the grants were given
directly to the students, the court found that the students served
merely as conduits for the transmission of the funds to the college.
Therefore, the program constituted a direct benefit to private educational institutions, including religious institutions, and violated article
VII, section 1, of the Alaska Constitution. 10 5 Sheldon Jackson College
suggests that the court will closely scrutinize such programs through a
broad interpretation of the direct benefit prohibition.
The second common area of claims raising establishment issues
involves laws that confer a benefit to or impose a detriment on a particular religious belief or practice.' 0 6 Despite language in the preamble suggesting the preeminence of God (and by implication, a theistic
belief system), the court has sought to ensure that laws in Alaska have
a secular foundation. In.Harris v. State,10 7 the court upheld a conviction for sodomy, refusing to recognize that "a rule of morality is necessarily a rule of law."' 08 The court said that the legislature could
"delimit and proscribe" specific acts of sexual conduct which have a
harmful effect on society without appealing to Judeo-Christian
morality. 109
Interestingly, it has been within the context of child custody disputes that the court has most clearly addressed the issue of whether a
law benefited a particular religious belief and therefore violated the
0 mentioned above in the
establishment clause. Bonjour v. Bonjour,11
103. Id. at 131. The court found that the program acted as an incentive to attend
private colleges. The court suggested, however, that a comparable subsidy to all students might pass constitutional scrutiny. See id. n.25.
104. Id. at 131-32. The 1976-77 grants were for $2500.
105. Id. at 132. Even though the court did not decide whether the program satisfied the public purpose requirement, the court identified a close interrelation between
the two provisions. Id. at 129. See Contec, Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage, 710
P.2d 1004, 1005 (Alaska 1985) (citing Lien, 383 P.2d 721 (Alaska 1963), as authority
under the public purpose provision, article IX, section 6). As the court resolved the
case under article VII, section 1, it did not reach the narrower issue of whether the
program also violated the establishment clause.
106. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Accord, Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 55-56 (1985).
107. 457 P.2d 638 (Alaska 1969).
108. Id. at 645.
109. Id. at 647.
110. 592 P.2d 1233 (Alaksa 1979).
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free exercise context,1 1 involved a challenge to an Alaska statute
which required the courts to consider the religious needs of a child, as
well as the abilities of the separate parents to address those needs, in
awarding custody.1 12 At trial, the court found that both parents were
equally qualified to meet the secular needs of their son but awarded
custody to the father because of his religious beliefs. 113 The supreme
court, while upholding the constitutionality of the statute, reversed
and remanded the case, holding that religious beliefs alone could not
1 14
constitute the sole determinant in awarding custody.
Initially, the court construed the statute to require courts to take
into account the actual religious needs of the child, as opposed to the
religious needs presumed from the parents' beliefs. The actual religious needs should be considered as only one factor that reflects on the
child's best interests.1 15 If the child has expressed no religious preference or is too young to do so, then the court is freed from such considerations. 116 The court insisted that a trial court can not "substitute its
own preferences, either for or against a particular type of religious
observance," but must remain strictly neutral in determining a child's
1 17
religious needs.
The court then turned to the question of whether its narrow interpretation of the statute was constitutional. Applying the threepronged "Lemon" test announced by the United States Supreme
Court for determining whether a law violates the establishment clause,
the court found that the statute satisfies the test.1 18 As quoted by the
court, the test provides the following:
In order to pass muster, a statute [1] must have a secular legislative
purpose, [2] must have a principal or primary effect that neither
111. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
112. The statute, ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.205 (1977)
STAT.

(current version at ALASKA

§ 25.24.150 (1983)), provided in pertinent part:

In determining the best interests of the child the court shall consider all
relevant factors including:
(1) the physical, emotional, mental, religious, and social needs of the
child;
(2) the capability and desire of each parent to meet these needs....

113. 592 P.2d at 1236-37.
114. Id. at 1239, 1244.
115. Id. at 1239-40. The court defined actual religious needs as "the expressed
preference of a child mature enough to make a choice between a form of religion or

the lack of it." Id. at 1240.

116. Id. The court suggested that children aged seven and under lack sufficient
maturity to form any serious religious preference.
117. Id. Accord, Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068, 1073 ("The determination of religious orthodoxy is not the business of a secular court.").
118. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
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advances nor inhibits religion, and [3] must not foster an excessive
government entanglement with religion. 119
Consideration of a child's actual religious needs serves a secular purpose in that it furthers the best interests of the child. Similarly, a
court's accommodation of a child's religious preference does not advance or inhibit religion but in fact satisfies the requirement that
courts remain neutral in religious matters. Finally, by focusing on the
child's actual religious needs, rather than those presumed needs,
courts avoid the entanglement that came from determining which parents' religious beliefs are more favorable to the best interests of the
child. 120 In Bonjour, however, the trial court's reliance on the religious beliefs of the parties, instead of the child's, failed both the primary effect and entanglement1prongs of the test and, thereby, required
12
that the case be remanded.
Bonjour stands as the court's best statement on the establishment
clause, aligning Alaska with the federal standard on establishment issues by utilizing the Lemon test, which seeks to draw a line between
strict separation and outright accommodation. While several members of the United States Supreme Court have recently criticized the
Lemon test, 122 the Alaska court continues to adhere to its principles.
V.

RELIGIOUS TAX EXEMPTION

Unlike the federal Constitution and several state constitutions,
the Alaska Constitution mandates an exemption from taxation for religious property. 123 In spite of this constitutional guarantee, issues involving tax exemption of church property rarely raise questions of
constitutional significance. 124 Article IX, section 4, of the Alaska
Constitution grants broad powers to the legislature to define exempt
enterprises; therefore, most claims involve issues of statutory construction. The cases in this area reveal that the Alaska Supreme Court
reads both the constitutional mandate and the statutory provisions
119. 592 P.2d at 1242 (quoting Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977)).
120. Id. at 1242-43.
121. Id. at 1244. The trial court's action also violated the secular purpose prong,
but less clearly than the other two prongs.
122. See Edwards v. Aguillard, -

U.S. -,

107 S. Ct. 2573, 2605 (1987) (Scalia,

J., dissenting); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 111-12 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
123. ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 4. Religious property is only one of several types
of property receiving an exemption. See D. KELLEY, WHY CHURCHES SHOULD NOT
PAY TAXEs (1977), for a well-written argument in favor of religious tax exemption.
124. In Waltz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), the Supreme Court rejected
arguments that tax exemptions for religious enterprises violate the establishment
clause. As both tax exemptions and the establishment clause are found in the Alaska

Constitution, the Alaska Supreme Court would be compelled to read each in conformity with the other.
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narrowly; tax exemptions are strictly construed. "All property is benefited by the security and protection furnished by the State, and it is
only just and equitable that expenses incurred in the operation and
maintenance of government should be fairly apportioned upon the

property of all.

.... 125

In 1964, the court considered its first religion tax exemption case.
Evangelical Covenant Church of America v. Nome 126 concerned the
interpretation of the statutory phrase "property used exclusively for
religious purposes."' 12 7 In a narrow interpretation of the statute, the
court held that a church-owned radio station that sold commercial air
time did not fit within the definition of property used exclusively for
religious purposes. According to the court, it was irrelevant that only
part of the radio time was sold or that the profits derived from the sale
were used to further the church's mission. The radio station had not
been used exclusively for religious purposes, and it was thereby subject
to ad valorem taxes. 128 The parsonage of an assistant pastor or lay
minister, however, was found to be within the exemption as "other
129
property of the organization not used for business, rent, or profit."'
In GreaterAnchorage Area Borough v. Sisters of Charity,1 30 the
court reaffirmed the strict statutory requirement that exempt property
must be used exclusively for religious or charitable purposes.' 3 ' In
Sisters of Charity, the court held that a building owned by a non-profit
religious organization but not used exclusively for non-profit hospital
purposes did not qualify for exemption from ad valorem taxes. 32 Sisters of Charity set the standard for other courts to use in determining
exemptions. First, courts must narrowly construe statutes granting
exemptions. In addition, exemptions should not be issued automatically; the taxpayer claiming the exemption has the burden of showing
125. Greater Anchorage Area Borough v. Sisters of Charity, 553 P.2d 467, 469
(Alaska 1976) (quoting Animal Rescue League v. Assessors of Bourne, 310 Mass. 330,
332, 37 N.E.2d 1019, 1021 (1914)).
126. 394 P.2d 882 (Alaska 1964).
127. ALASKA STAT. § 29.10.336 (1957) provides that "all property used exclusively for religious, educational, or charitable purposes... is exempt," and that "the
term 'property used for religious purposes' includes the residence of the pastor, priest,
or minister of a religious organization, and other property of the organization not used
for business, rent, or profit."
128. 394 P.2d at 885.
129. Id. at 885-86. Following the case, the state legislature amended the statute
and removed the "other property" provision. In Harmon v. North Pacific Union
Conference Ass'n of Seventh Day Adventists, 462 P.2d 432, 436-39 (Alaska 1969), the
court held that the legislature's action repealing the clause narrowed the scope of the
exemption and that the residences of church administrators, teachers, and clergy not
committed exclusively to local congregations did not qualify.
130. 553 P.2d 467 (Alaska 1976).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 472.
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that the property is not eligible for taxation. Finally, the courts must
look at the actual use of a building, as well as the owner's use, in

determining whether the building is used exclusively for religious pur-

poses. 133 The court reaffirmed its strict standard for granting exemptions in Sisters of Providence in Washington v. Municipality of
34
Anchorage.1
The court's most complete statement on tax exemption of religious property is found in City of Nome v. CatholicBishop of Northern
list of exemptions under a statAlaska. 1 35 The case presents a 1detailed
36
ute similar to the current law.
CatholicBishop reaffirmed the standards set forth in the Sisters of
Charity137 and Sisters of Providence138 cases. First, the taxpayer
claiming an exemption bears the burden of producing sufficient evidence to prove the property's eligibility for an exemption. 139 Furthermore, the statutes granting exemptions are to be narrowly construed

against the applicant.' 40 Finally, the term "exclusive use" requires
that all uses of the property be for the "direct and primary" exempt

133. Id. at 469-70.
134. 672 P.2d 446, 451-52 (Alaska 1983) (holding that private property leased by a
nonprofit hospital was not exempt as the lessor made a profit from the lease).
135. 707 P.2d 870 (Alaska 1985).
136. The claims were brought under ALASKA STAT. § 29.53.020 (1984) (current
version at ALASKA STAT. § 29.45.030) (1988)), which provides in part:
Required exemptions. (a) The following property is exempt from general
taxation:
(3) property used exclusively for nonprofit religious, charitable, cemetery, hospital or educational purposes;
(b) "Property used exclusively for religious purposes" includes the following property owned by a religious organization:
(1) the residence of a bishop, pastor, priest, rabbi, minister or religious
order of a recognized religious organization;
(2) a structure, its furniture and its fixtures used solely for public worship, charitable purposes, religious administrative offices, religious education
or a nonprofit hospital;
(3) lots supporting and adjacent to a structure or residence mentioned
in (1) or (2) of this subsection which are necessary to convenient use;
(4) lots required by local ordinance for parking near a structure defined in (2) of this subsection.
In all, the court had to decide the exemption status of more than 46 items/holdings.
A summary is found following the CatholicBishop decision at page 895. A thorough
reading of the case is recommended to interested persons seeking detailed information
on specific exemptions.
137. 553 P.2d 467 (Alaska 1976). See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
138. 672 P.2d 446 (Alaska 1983). See supra note 130.
139. 707 P.2d at 878.
140. Id. at 878-79. Still, the requirement of strict statutory construction should be
"an aid to, not a substitute for, [reasonable] statutory interpretation." Id. at 879.
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purpose. Property "occasionally used for a nonexempt purpose is not
exempt since1 the property must be used exclusively for exempt
14
purposes."'
After reaffirming its standard, the court went on to recognize two
exceptions to the exclusive use rule. First, "occasional use of true minor import or a de minimis use will not defeat" the exclusive use requirement. 42 In addition, "property used for purposes directly
incidental to and vitally necessary for the exempt use of other property" will also be entitled to a tax exemption. 14 3 This latter exception
to the exclusive use rule also applies to property used part-time for
religiously exempt purposes, so long as it remains directly incidental
and vitally necessary for the use of other exempt property.' 44
From there, the court considered whether a series of structures
and items qualified for exemptions. In the only additional departure
from previous cases, the court found that the legislature had broadened the exemption for residences of spiritual leaders to include residences of individuals not exclusively engaged as ministers in a local
congregation. 14 5 The court also allowed an exemption for a churchowned radio station that was able to show a combination of religious,
charitable, and educational uses, thereby clarifying its decision in EvangelicalCovenant Church.146 Overall, however, CatholicBishop reaffirmed the court's position that exemptions are to be narrowly
construed.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The cases discussed above indicate that the Alaska Supreme
Court has committed itself to a broad reading of the free exercise
clause. In light of more recent pronouncements by the United States
Supreme Court, the Alaska court's approach to free exercise issues
appears to be in line with the decisions of the Warren and early Burger
Courts. This is not to suggest that the Alaska court comes down on
one side or the other of the liberal-conservative spectrum. Religious
141. Id. The property, however, "need not be devoted exclusively to a single exempt purpose to meet the 'exclusive use' requirement. If the property is used exclusively for any combination of religious, charitable or educational purposes, [the

statute] is satisfied." Id at 880.

142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 881. The court also held that under the exclusive use rule, property
could not be apportioned by time into exempt and nonexempt uses. Spacial apportionment of property and structures, however, is allowable.
145. Id. at 883-84.
146. Id. at 889-90. See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.

258

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:237

liberty issues do not easily fit into ideological categories. 14 7 But, when
compared to the recent decisions of its federal counterpart, the Alaska
court has been more willing to protect free exercise claims against gov1 48
ernment infringement.
Frank 149 suggests a broad protection for religiously motivated
conduct.1 50 Even with a showing of a compelling governmental interest, the state will be required in certain instances to create exceptions
for religious practices. Chief Justice Matthews, the author of the
Frank and Wondzell II decisions, questions whether it is possible for
the courts to make a clear distinction between religious belief and action.15 1 If such a ruling were applied to Justice Connor's statement in
Wondzell I, that all conscientious believers may be constitutionally entitled to the same benefits as those who believe in a supreme being, the
realm of protected religious action would be greatly expanded. Even
147. One can debate whether restricting the freedom of religious groups whose
actions present a threat to public health and safety is conservative or liberal. See Pack
v. Tennessee ex rel. Swann, 424 U.S. 954 (1977) (upholding a law that forbade snake
handling and the consumption of poison by pentecostals).
107 S. Ct. 2400 (1987) (state prison
148. See O'Lone v. Shabazz, - U.S. -,
officials did not violate first amendment free exercise of religion clause in precluding
Islamic prisoners from attending services held during work hours as policy was related
to legitimate security and rehabilitation concerns and alternative means of exercising
various other religious practices available); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (statutory requirement that state agency use social security numbers in the administration of
the federal food stamp and Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) programs does not violate the free exercise clause, notwithstanding the beliefs of parents
of a Native American child, who believed use of the number would harm the child's
spirit and prevent her from attaining greater spiritual power); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, (1986) (first amendment did not prohibit application of Air
Force regulation which prevented wearing visible religious apparel while on duty and
in uniform to orthodox Jews desiring to wear a yarmulke). In all three cases, Court
majorities took a more limited view of the reach of the free exercise clause. In
Goldman and O'Lone, involving free exercise claims in the military and in prison,
respectively, the Court employed a more deferential standard of review (reasonableness) than it had employed in earlier free exercise cases (strict scrutiny). While both
cases can be explained by the special contexts within which they arose, the same cannot be said for Bowen. In Bowen, a plurality of the majority argued for a different
standard of review for situations that merely involve the less obtrusive placing of
"conditions" on belief as opposed to situations where religious belief is restricted
through governmental "compulsion." Bowen, 476 U.S. at 706-08.
149. 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979).
150. It is unclear whether the court would provide a similar exception to all religious claimants. Alaska Natives may present a unique case, as did the Amish in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235-36 (1972), where the Supreme Court found the
Amish presented a compelling set of facts that few other religious groups could duplicate. The Supreme Court has recently refused to extend the Yoder exemption to fundamentalists. See Mozert v. Hawkins County Public Schools, 647 F. Supp. 1194
(E.D. Tenn. 1986), rev'd, 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 108
S. Ct. 1029 (1988).
151. Frank, 604 P.2d at 1070 n.4.
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as it now stands, the Alaska Constitution provides greater protection
for the free exercise of one's religious beliefs than that presently af152
forded under the first amendment.
The establishment clause developed in a somewhat different fashion. Instead of continuing to read the clause expansively, thereby
overturning most laws and programs that benefit religion, the court
has backed away from its earlier interpretation in Matthews, 153 which
can be said to represent the extreme reach of strict separation of
55
church and state in Alaska. Lien 154 and Sheldon Jackson College 1
suggest a more moderate approach to government programs that may
incidentally assist religion. Still, Alaska appears less willing than
many states with large, powerful religious blocks (such as Catholics in
the East and evangelicals in the South) to enact programs which financially assist religious enterprises. While the standard in Sheldon Jackson College'5 6 is less strict than before, the court will continue to
closely scrutinize programs to see whether they directly benefit religions or appropriate monies for something other than a public
purpose.
Furthermore, with Boniour,157 the court aligned Alaska with the
federal standard for reviewing establishment clause claims. Therefore,
even if a program can survive the court's "direct benefit" and "public
purpose" analysis, it may fail the three-pronged Lemon test.'5 8 The
court's decisions indicate that cases that do not involve public appropriations, but rather merely confer a benefit or impose a detriment
because of religious belief, will also be subject to careful scrutiny.
Taken as a whole, it is clear that the court considers the establishment clause to prohibit more than the establishment of a state religion
or discrimination among religious sects. 159 The government may not
appropriate funds that directly benefit any religious enterprise, 160 may
not authorize religious activities in schools, 16 1 may not question the
152. Id. See also Wondzell I, 583 P.2d 860, 866 n.12 (Alaska 1978).
153. 362 P.2d 932 (Alaska 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 517 (1962).
154. 383 P.2d 721 (Alaska 1963).
155. 599 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1979).
156. Id.
157. 592 P.2d 1233 (Alaska 1979).
158. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
159. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 92-113 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (providing an overview of the court's past establishment clause decisions); Fisher v. Fairbanks
North Star Borough School Dist., 704 P.2d 213 (Alaska 1985) (school board's attempt
to design a curriculum to favor a particular religion is a violation of the first amendment and curriculum furthering racial bias or partisan political preference is constitutionally suspect).
160. Sheldon Jackson College v. State, 599 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1979).
161. Fisher v. Fairbanks North Star Borough School, 704 P.2d 213 (Alaska 1985).
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orthodoxy of any particular religious belief,162 and may not pass legislation that favors the tenets or adherents of any religion or of religion
over non-religion. 163 The court eloquently stated the purposes of the
clause:
[T]he establishment clause stands independently as a barrier to government action which favors religion over non-religion. The establishment clause protects the right not to believe in any religion. It
protects the right not to be punished for not believing, or simply not
caring. 164
Finally, with regard to tax exemption for religious property, the
standard is set in Catholic Bishop.165 The state legislature has great
leeway in defining exemptions, and the court will narrowly construe
those statutes granting exemptions. This approach is consistent with
the court's analysis under the establishment clause and the direct benefit and public purpose provisions of the constitution.
At the beginning of his decision in Frank,Justice Matthews wrote
that "[n]o value has a higher place in our constitutional system of government than that of religious freedom."' 66 From all indications, the
court takes this pronouncement seriously. The Alaska court has been
willing to provide religious exemptions from statutes that are otherwise neutral toward religious belief.167 The court also held that people
cannot incur a legal burden solely because of their religious beliefs. 6 8
Moreover, the court has ensured that the line between church and
state is maintained by striking down laws that lack a public purpose or
that provide a direct benefit to religion.' 69
Through these decisions, the Alaska court has guaranteed the
right of people to practice their beliefs, religious or otherwise, free
from government intrusion or oversight. Religious organizations are
free to proselytize while disbelievers are spared the burden of adhering
to a particular system of belief. Furthermore, by abstaining from supporting or endorsing religion, government allows religion to flourish
on its own. This is what Thomas Jefferson intended when he wrote
that "religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979).
Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233 (Alaska 1979).
Id. at 1241.
707 P.2d 870 (Alaska 1985).
604 P.2d at 1070.
Id. at 1075; Wondzell v. Alaska Wood Prod., Inc., 601 P.2d 584 (Alaska

1979).
168. Flores v. State, 443 P.2d 73 (Alaska 1968); Johnson v. Johnson, 564 P.2d 71
(Alaska 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1048 (1978).
169. Fisher v. Fairbanks North Star Borough School, 704 P.2d 213, 217 (Alaska
1985) (school "board may not design a curriculum to favor a particular religion");
Sheldon Jackson College v. State, 599 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1979).
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God." 170 In essence, the more that religion and government are kept
separate, the greater the freedom afforded believer and non-believer
alike. As a result of the Alaska court's interpretations of the state's
constitution, religious liberty and separation of church and state are
alive and well in Alaska.

170. Reply to the Danbury Baptist Association, Jan. 1, 1802, quoted in J.
135 (1985).
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